

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

AND

INTERVENTION IN SANTO DOMINGO

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On February 15, 1905, President Roosevelt sent a special message to the Senate, accompanied by a protocol signed eight days previously with the Dominican Republic. By virtue of this protocol the Dominican Republic agreed to turn over the control of its custom-houses to the United States. It was the culmination of a series of long drawn-out negotiations between the two governments. The turbulent political situation in the island and a debt between thirty and forty millions were the chief causes of the agreement. Through it the United States was formally invited to intervene in the internal affairs of that Caribbean nation.

It is the purpose of this paper to trace the forces that led to this agreement; to see how the Monroe Doctrine, or rather, a new phase of it, was promulgated in connection with this intervention; and to point out the part that Theodore Roosevelt played in the whole affair.

It is hard to determine the motives that prompted Roosevelt in the Dominican affair, but the available facts point to four motives:

(1) fear of European intervention of a more or less permanent nature in the Dominican Republic; (2) the desire to protect the lives and ~~the~~ promote as well as protect the economic interests of citizens of the United States; (3) willingness to gratify certain expansionist impulses; and (4) a disposition to give aid to the inhabitants of the Dominican Republic....

All these factors influenced Roosevelt in his action. It is, nevertheless, impossible to ascertain which one of them impressed him the most.

Americans and Intervention

The Americans with economic interests in Santo Domingo made continuous appeals to Roosevelt personally and to the State Department for

intervention.

The Hugh Kelly and Company of New York made a direct appeal to Roosevelt on January 23, 1904. The company argued that the citizens of the United States had valuable investments in the Dominican Republic, investments which were also of great economic importance to Santo Domingo. These interests, however, were at the mercy of the untrained and unintelligent mobs led by opposing political leaders, whose object was personal gain rather than the welfare of the country. Neither persons nor property were likely to be saved from the onslaught of these mobs. Furthermore, a blockade of the ports had been declared at the time the Americans were getting ready to harvest their sugar cane. The company urged Roosevelt to "Cubanize" the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. ²

On January 2, 1904, A. F. Suárez pleaded for intervention to Secretary John Hay on behalf of the Central Ansonia Sugar Company. The insurgents were running loose at ~~A. S. S.~~, where ripening American plantations were located. The Central Ansonia alone had a quarter million dollars at stake.

W. L. Bass, owner of the largest sugar plantation in the Dominican Republic, constantly urged for intervention. Writing on December 12, 1903, to W. F. Powell, minister of the United States in the Republic, he said:

Now is the moment to locate at least three men-of-war on the coast and announce to the contending factions, that although there is no Platt Amendment [restricting the sovereignty of the Republic], upon the first promiscuous use of firearms order will be maintained by foreign force ... and modern industries must be allowed to continue to operate and life and property respected.

In subsequent letters Bass insinuated that the Dominican Government was pro-German, dictatorial, and cruel. He believed that the United States should intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic and not

merely control the customs.

The preceding cases represented the sugar interests. Similar pleas for intervention came from the shipping and transportation interests.

Another group of Americans who constantly urged for intervention were the sentimental expansionists. They formed a rather small group but their attitude is an indication that the spirit of imperialism had not entirely disappeared. From some of them Roosevelt received some startling suggestions.

On March 12, 1904, Roderick Smith of Buffalo, New York, in a letter suggested to Roosevelt a policy of five steps:

First step. -- Obtain a request from the Government of Santo Domingo, if any exists, or from its citizens, to be held in trust by the United States pending the rehabilitation and proper ordering of its government.

Second step. -- Present this request to Congress and advise its acceptance.

Third step. -- When Congress accepts the Trusteeship, appoint a governor of Santo Domingo ... and give him a staff of practical young men who have the brains to work out this plan.

Fourth step. -- Go ahead with the job, get up a new constitution, if necessary, adjust and fund the debt, fix the currency (American money perhaps can be put in), fix the tariff, see that the customs are honestly collected and accounted for, look after the internal revenue, the Post Office Department, the guards, the police In short, ... set up a first class little republic, or as good [a government] ... as the present development of that people will admit The American Flag officially to be flown on the same staff over the Dominican Flag during the period of trusteeship.

Fifth step. -- When this is all done and working nicely, take down the American Flag, say farewell, and sail away. Leave these people to ripen, we can use them later on. ... We pick no fruit, however, until it is ripe; to do otherwise might give us political colic.

Smith wanted his plan to be applied to all the twenty republics of the Western Hemisphere. In a letter to Roosevelt on January 18, 1906, he specifically recommends the application of his plan -- "hold it in trust, fix it up, let it go, [and use it later when needed]" to the other free na-

tions of the new world. In other words, start them on the road to annexation.

On June 30, 1904, Dewitt Clinton Chipman, writing from Anderson, Indiana, although he was originally from New York, told Roosevelt of the grand role he had in mind for his nation. Wrote he:

What I wish to suggest, and what you can accomplish, is to unite all the governments on the American Continent, and the isles of the adjacent seas, into one grand Confederacy of Republics, and declare that no Kingdom or Monarchy shall be ever established [here]. ... The Old world for Despotism, the New World for Republics.

To set in motion his plans for a grand confederation, Chipman suggested that Roosevelt convene a convention of the American republics to meet in Washington on July 4, 1905.

Another letter written to Roosevelt and dated December 27, 1905, came from the hand of W. S. Wright, a veteran of the Spanish-American War and former editor of a newspaper, The Journal, of Logansport, Indiana. He reminded Roosevelt of a plan that was under way for the occupation of the Dominican Republic shortly after the military occupation of Cuba. Wright himself had gone to Santo Domingo. From there he had proceeded to Washington to confer with McKinley, Hay, and the leaders of the House and Senate. Both Hay and McKinley agreed with his plan but deemed it necessary to postpone it because of the anti-expansion sentiment.

But the invested interests and the expansionists were not the only ones that urged for intervention. The officers of the Navy, motivated no doubt by imperialism and the desire for naval bases, also were in favor of bringing the unlucky republic under the protection of the United States.

Writing on May 30, 1904, to the Secretary of the Navy, Rear-Admiral W. C. Wise expressed himself as follows:

Eventually the United States will have to assume grave responsibility on the island in order to work out the solution for a stable government.

It is very necessary that complete examination ... be made of the entire coast, and the small vessels policing these waters should be required to carry on surveys at every opportunity so that full knowledge can be obtained...

On June 26, 1904, Rear-Admiral C. D. Sigsbee wrote to his chief urging for strong action. He suggested a course similar to that taken in the case of Cuba and Panama and also mentioned places suitable for naval bases.

Commander Albert C. Dillingham of the Detroit was also in favor of dominating the island. He had been in Dominican waters for some time and knew the situation at first hand. On August 21, 1904, he addressed a long letter to Loomis in which he depicted the conditions on the island. The time was ripe for action on the part of the United States, he thought. He feared intervention by other powers. On December 6, 1904, writing to Loomis again, he was even more drastic. He said:

We must govern the country as well as control its financing till the people of Santo Domingo can learn to govern themselves. Govern the country, control its finances, use a native police force well organized, employ the unemployed in building roads, ... revise the tariff, and we will give to the world in no very long time another orderly and prosperous republic.

Thus far we have considered the attitude of the invested interests, and the civilian and Navy expansionists. No doubt their influence was great in influencing Roosevelt and the State Department to intervene in the island. How, much, we do not know.

The pleas from the invested interests were especially influential in bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on the Dominican government. Besides, several times landings were expected with the express purpose of protecting American lives and property. Strong support was given to one American company, the San Domingo Improvement Company, with chief offices in New York and a branch and several subsidiaries in Santo Domingo. The company had gone into Santo Domingo in 1899. In 1893 it took charge of the Dominican customs and the flotation of government bonds. As the years passed the position of the company became worse and worse, until in January, 1901 the government canceled its right to collect customs on the ground that it had failed to live up to the terms of the contract. The company appealed to the United States government but the State Department favored private negotiations. Nevertheless, strong diplomatic pressure was exerted against the Dominican authorities. Finally,

In [January 31] 1903, by an arbitration protocol the claim of the San Domingo Improvement Company of New York was submitted to a board of arbitrators consisting of John D. Carlisle, Manuel de J. Galvan and Judge George Gray. These rendered an award July 14, 1904, providing for the redelivery of the various properties to the Santo Domingo Republic and the payment by the republic of \$4,481,250 in monthly instalments to the financial agents of the United States and for the security of such payments the customs revenues and custom houses of Puerto

Plata, Sánchez, Samaná and Montecristy, and all other ports of entry or custom houses now existing or as might thereafter be established on the coast or in the interior north of eighteen degrees and forty-five minutes and east of the Haitian boundary, were to be assigned and designated, which custom houses were to be turned over to a financial agent [in case the Republic failed to meet the payments], to be appointed by the United States, who was to have entire charge of such custom houses and of the collection of the revenues therefrom.³

This was a severe blow to the Republic. Without the income from these ports the government could not maintain itself. Consequently, the government soon defaulted, and in accordance with the agreement a financial agent of the United States took charge of the custom houses of Puerto Plata on October 20, 1904. Monte Cristy was taken over on February 10, 1905. Interestingly enough, the first financial agent was a company agent. However, the aid of war vessels was soon invoked in order to maintain the financial agent in safety. Evidently things were somewhat rough.

European Powers and Intervention

The Americans were not the only ones who had economic interests in the Dominican Republic. Nationals of France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Germany also had claims against the Dominican government. With all these countries trying to reach a settlement with poor and revolutionary Santo Domingo, one is not surprised at the confusion that resulted from such a scramble for settlement. Roosevelt was fearful of the final outcome of the intrigues of these European powers. Their attitude undoubtedly influenced his final choice.

Letters arriving at this time to Roosevelt and the State Department from the Caribbean often made allusions to the sinister intentions of the European powers with claims against the island. Germany was often mentioned in these letters.

On November 4, 1902, and January 5, 1903, our Minister in the Republic, W. F. Powell, wrote to the State Department concerning the activities of the agent of the Hamburg-American Steamship Company. The latter had secured the lowering of port dues, thus forcing the Clyde Steamship Company (an American concern which had free entrance to the ports) to withdraw its ships.⁴

On March 1, 1903, Powell reported that he had been told that the German consul had been instructed to observe his movements with utmost care. The consul was ordered to report to Berlin, said Powell,

a history of the cases which I have called to the attention of this Government, and what action this Government has taken, and whether pressure is being exercised to compel a settlement.

On April 3, 1903, Powell sent a clipping from a Haitian paper quoting a French newspaper. The French were protesting against the arrangement made with the San Domingo Improvement Company without the participation of France, Belgium, and Germany, and manifested that these countries were getting ready to demand a joint administration.

Powell's letters of May 12, September 12 and 14, 1903, reported on the German schemes concerning naval bases. He reported that the foreign ministers of the Republic, Jesús Galván, had intentions of granting Samaná and Manzanillo Bays to Germany as coaling stations. Powell, however, suspected that this was a strategical maneuver in order to force the United States to make a higher bidding. The foreign minister had also presented a project before the legislature to make free the ports of his country.

On February 26, 1904, Powell sent to the State Department a translation of a letter in which a certain Demetrio Rodríguez, a follower of Juan

Isidro Jimenez, urged the German consul to get Germany to recognize the belligerency of the Jimenistas and besides to form a secret alliance with that faction. Such a movement was of course directed against the United States from which the Dominican president, Carlos F. Morales, was trying to secure aid.

But the German intrigues were not the only ones to be observed and reported by the American authorities in Santo Domingo. Other nations' movements were also closely watched.

On June 8, 1903, the French ambassador in Washington, Jules Jusserand, suggested to the State Department in a communication the possibility of conflict between the arrangement of the San Domingo Improvement Company and the former claims of Belgian and French nationals. It seems that the creditors of France and Belgium had close connections.

On September 15, 1903, the United States minister informed the State Department of rumors of a scheme by which the United States, Belgium, and France were to protect the claims of their nationals. Soon afterwards Powell reported that W. L. Bass, an American capitalist and the largest sugar planter in the island, was in favor of the plan. According to the scheme, the powers concerned were to submit their claims to the Dominican Government for immediate liquidation; the Dominican foreign minister was to declare of the inability of the nation to pay and thereupon a proposition was to be made by one of the foreign diplomats for the control and administration of the Republic by an international commission. The Dominican government was said to have favored the scheme.

On October 29, 1903, Powell wrote that the Belgian ^{chargé} minister in Santo Domingo had told him that the governments of Belgium, France, and the

United States were to be asked to take over the collection of customs. When Powell objected that such a movement would antagonize Italy and Germany, the Belgian insinuated that a small sum could be set aside to satisfy the claims of these two countries. At Powell's suggestion the proposals were sent to Washington for further consideration, but nothing was ever done about them.

In a letter of November 25, 1903, Powell shows how alarmed he was over the whole situation. He wrote:

As it stands today the country is virtually bankrupt, and this condition ... implies danger to our Government, as foreign creditors will demand payment of their claims, which demand will be enforced by the guns of Foreign Vessels. At the same time our citizens will make a like demand. This is the grave danger that confronts us, and it will [require] ... the wisest statesmanship to avert it.

On December 21, three German warships arrived at Santo Domingo but left after four hours, leaving the patrolling service to American men-of-war. Previously Powell had reported that the German consul had been directed to call war vessels from St. Thomas when needed without getting in touch with Berlin. But now the German minister had to inform Berlin first in case any help was necessary.

On April 14, 1904, Powell wrote that the Italian minister in Habana was coming to Santo Domingo on April 17 for the purpose of demanding the Dominican government to comply with an agreement signed in 1903. The Italian consul was thought to be supported by Italian war vessels, which would proceed to take possession of certain ports in case the Dominican government refused to pay. In reality these were hot rumors. The Italian minister came but no drastic action followed.

The award of July 14, 1904, in favor of the San Domingo Company brought protests from Italy on October 3 and December 24, 1904.

Thomas C. Dawson, who had substituted Powell as American minister

in Santo Domingo, reported on September 8, 1904, that representatives of European powers intended to present a joint demand to the Dominican government. The United States was invited to participate in the demand but Dawson declined the invitation.

The months of October and November of 1904 witnessed a wave of protest from European powers against the July 14 award in favor of the San Domingo Improvement Company. Already on October 20, as we have noted, an American had taken charge of the custom houses in Puerto Plata. In November the French ambassador, Jusserand, was expected to urge the United States to take over the custom houses of the republic.

On December 14, 1904, Dawson informed the Secretary of State that the French had lost all hope of collecting their claims by peaceful means and were ready to use force, but would not take any step without consulting the State Department.

On December 28, 1904, Dawson received the cipher telegram:

You will sound the government of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly and in perfect friendly spirit, touching the disquieting situation which is developing owing to the pressure of other Governments having arbitral awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflicting with their rights. Already one European Government strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Dominican customs ports to secure its own payments. There appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government and the several claimants. We have ground to think that such an arrangement would satisfy the other powers, besides serving as a practical guarantee of the peace of Santo Domingo from internal and external disturbances.

It appears from the evidence given above that the United States was greatly concerned about the attitude the European powers assumed time and again toward their claims in Santo Domingo. From the correspondence be-

tween the American ministers and the State Department it can be safely inferred that the United States was against intervention by European powers. Besides, the American government was against any joint control. Thus only one possibility was left, as Roosevelt thought, and that was intervention by the United States to prevent intervention by European powers whose claims he considered good, and to dodge any proposition of joint control.

The Dominicans and Intervention

The Dominicans also had an attitude on this projected intervention of the United States. Their desire to have close relations with the United States goes back to 1849. In that year President Báez wanted either France or the United States to assume a protectorate over the island. In 1869 and 1873 Báez was in favor of annexation by the United States. In 1877, when in trouble with Haiti, the President requested aid from the United States and was still in favor of annexation. And finally in 1899, just before his assassination, President Heureaux wanted the United States to establish a protectorate over the island. The attitude of the Dominican government from there on will be discussed more fully.

On May 3, 1902, Powell reported that a considerable number of Dominicans were in favor of closer bonds with the United States.⁶

On November 4, 1903, writing on the constant civil war that shook the country and on the general instability, Powell said:

As long as this state of things continues, the future of the country is dark, and for this reason those who are not aspirants for political offices or honors will hail the day when the Republic knows no other flag than ours. This feeling is shared by every large merchant, by all the foreigners (with the exception possibly of our German friends). It is so prevalent that one can hear the children in the streets and plazas say: "When the Americans come here we will have law,

and we (boys) will not be allowed to have pistols." Others have said: "When the [American] flag is placed over Dominican soil, there will not be a hand to draw it down."

On December 17, 1903, Powell wrote concerning a visit that President Carlos F. Morales had paid him at the legation. Morales was after support and recognition from the United States. He wanted Santo Domingo to have the same status as Cuba had under the Platt Amendment. In return for these concessions, the Dominican government would grant the United States certain control over the fiscal affairs of the country and lease Samaná and Manzanillo Bays for fifty years.

For the purpose of signing a treaty with the United States, General Juan F. Sanchez was sent to Washington in the latter part of January, 1904. On February 3, Francis B. Loomis received from Sanchez proposals for a "treaty of alliance, amity, and reciprocity." These were his terms:

- (1) The United States was to guarantee the independence of the Dominican Republic as well as its full sovereignty over the whole of its territory.
- (2) The United States should also agree to reduce the tariff on Dominican sugar, tobacco, cocoa, and other agricultural products as well as on manufactured products.
- (3) The Dominican government would cede to the United States during the life of the treaty coaling and naval stations at Samaná and Manzanillo, but the Dominican Republic would retain sovereignty over these bays as well as the right to collect and control customs levied on them.
- (4) In consideration of said lease the United States was to pay an annual sum sufficient to meet the Dominican Republic's engagements to foreign creditors, this annual fund to be controlled by the United States.
- (5) In addition, the United States government was to lend various types of assistance to the Dominican Republic in the maintenance of order: (a) \$100,000 upon the signing of the treaty and \$200,000 one month thereafter; (b) arms and munitions to be supplied, and warships when needed; (c) arms and supplies to be prevented from reaching the insurgents from abroad, as likewise armed expeditions with hostile intent.
- (6) The United States was to serve as mediator and protector of the republic in its relations with foreign nations.
- And (7) the Washington government would build and maintain at its own expense various lighthouses on the Dominican coast.

This summary of this memorandum is given to show that no mention was made of customs control. Sánchez wanted the United States to give the island economic concessions, to help her financially, to aid in maintaining law and order, and to guarantee the territorial integrity of the republic. In return, Sánchez offered a lease on Samaná and Manzanillo Bays. It goes without saying that American interests would have benefitted greatly from the treaty. Thus it is seen that at this stage of the game Santo Domingo was reluctant to have the United States take charge of its custom houses. At any rate, Sánchez was not in favor of it. He even reserved for the island the right to collect and control the revenues in the Bays rented to the United States.

"The notion of customs control originated with Loomis or his subordinates," says Rippey.⁸ Loomis believed that the custom houses were the chief source of revolutions, and that if law and order were to be kept the custom houses had to be under the control of the United States.

In February, Loomis, Admiral Dewey, and an official of the Department of Commerce were sent by Roosevelt to investigate the conditions on the island. After returning in March, Loomis made a confidential report. A section of it said:

The conservative, property-owning, and industrious people of the country, irrespective of nationality -- foreigners and natives alike -- talk seriously and with evident favor of annexation to the United States. General Morales and the politicians of his following suggest, with much force, that peace of a permanent nature would be secured if the administration of the custom-houses of the country were undertaken by the Government of the United States. ... If the United States controlled the custom-houses there would be nothing for the revolutionists to fight for. The agricultural element of the population probably would favor this, and all classes would, I think, save the rather small contingent of military-political freebooters who have nothing to lose and much to gain by main-

taining a state of anarchy in the country.

...General Morales is willing or even desirous of making some such arrangement with this country, and, in connection with it, giving us a long lease on Samana Bay, for which he would expect to receive a cash money consideration. He would probably be satisfied with \$100,000 in hand and \$150,000 paid in half a dozen annual installments. Morales would also agree to a supervision by us of public expenditures.⁹

It seems that Loomis stood for intervention. Besides, the idea of customs control seems to have originated with him, for on March 16 Powell had sent him the following cable:

According to your instructions the President agrees to place Custom Houses in the custody of the Government of the United States, also the bays named at rental to be agreed upon.

Things were ready for intervention at this time but nothing happened. Apparently Roosevelt was afraid of the effect that such a step might have in the presidential election in November. Not until after the election was Dawson directed to start official negotiations.

Sanchez in Washington was still demanding an answer to his proposals. But finally he was turned down. Secretary Ray informed him, as diplomatically as possible, that the President did not consider the time appropriate for intervention, as the Republic seemed to be making some progress toward a settlement of its troubles.

It is interesting to note that President Morales was anxious to see the United States intervene in the island. Was there any reason for this kind disposition? Yes, indeed! He owed his position to the opportune intervention of the American Navy. During the revolutionary movements, the Navy landed forces in several parts of the island where fighting was taking place. In every case its activities favored Morales. A. C. Dillingham,

Commander of the U.S.S. Detroit even said that he was "entirely responsible for the placing of Morales in power." Thus we have the peculiar situation in which the United States received an invitation to intervene in the affairs of another nation by a man who had been put into power through the help of the American Navy.

But Morales was not the only leader who favored American intervention. Juan Isidro Jiménez, the rival of Morales, also urged it. T. E. D. Veeder, Commander of the Hartford, wrote on March 14, 1904, that Jiménez' wish

is that the United States should intervene so far as to secure a fair election and that the status of the country should be the same as the status of Cuba under the Platt Amendment, this with the single exception that he added the "words more or less."

Evidently Jiménez stood for a different kind of intervention.

Even after intervention had taken place, Jiménez advocated a fair election under the supervision of the United States. Writing in January, 1906, to the governor of Puerto Rico, where he was in exile, he said:

The present historic epoch peremptorily demands that the United States, the only protector of these small nations, decide to exert their influence over them, for the sake of civilization, and lift them up from the anarchy and prostration in which they lie.

Other leaders also favored intervention.

As for the rest of the Dominican people, their attitude is not known. Probably the illiterate masses simply followed their leaders. The attitude of those who were neither army officers nor politicians, but who were seriously concerned about the fate of the island, was never gauged.

The only evidence that is available as to the attitude of the Dominican people as a whole are letters written by Dillingham and Dawson, the negotiators of the protocol of February 7, 1905. Their views, however, must

be taken cautiously for both Dawson and Dillingham were adent advocates of intervention.

On May 16, 1904, Dillingham wrote:

The people see *** that we are working for peace and order; the idea that we desire conquest or annexation has vanished, and from the Executive Mansion and the Archbishop's palace to the bumboat, everyone is looking to the United States as the one hope for their country.

On July 6, just a few days after his arrival at the republic, Dawson wrote to John Hay:

With hardly an exception, the many Dominicans whom I have met in the last nine days have told me that a long continuance of peace cannot be expected unless the United States government intervenes. The officials are nearly as frank in this point, as the merchants and farmers who are not in politics. Practically all classes seem to expect and hope for some form of American protection.

In spite of this apparent acquiescence on the part of the Dominican people, there was, nevertheless, strong opposition to the occupation of the customhouses.

The San Domingo Improvement Company opposed such a movement from the beginning. Vice-president Ramon Caceres wanted the independence of the nation guaranteed in any kind of arrangement. Before negotiations had started, Dillingham wrote to the State Department on December 18, 1904, (letter not received until December 28) as follows:

The people here and throughout the Cibao are just at present very antagonistic to the idea of American control of customs houses, and to Americans generally, and I have heard well-defined rumors of possible personal violence to American lives and property if any other customs houses are turned over to American management.

It seems that President Roosevelt did not take into consideration this opposition. At any rate, he always spoke of the intervention as being in complete accord with Dominican desires.

After negotiations started the opposition increased. The Dominicans had good reasons to resent American intervention, especially after the protocol of February 7, 1904, which was applied by Roosevelt under the modus vivendi until Congress ratified the convention of February 8, 1904.

Ripsey gives the following reasons:

The United States hesitated to include in this agreement a blanket guaranty of national independence and territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic; refused to require the creditors to bear the expenses of the receivership; refused to accept a joint collectorship by the agents of the two governments; and failed to grant the Dominican government as large a share of the customs as it desired. . . . The assertion that the United States initiated the receivership by means of military force would be approximately correct.¹⁰

Roosevelt in Action

Now we have the historical background of the Dominican intervention. With it in mind let us consider the statements that Roosevelt made concerning the affair. Perhaps we can discover his motives and attitudes. But before doing that it would be profitable to bring into the picture the attitude that Roosevelt assumed in the Venezuelan imbroglio of 1902-1903, a situation similar to that of Santo Domingo.

The Venezuelan crisis came out of Dictator Cipriano Castro's fast and loose playing with foreign contracts and properties. His courts refused to give foreigners justice and in some instances did not even hear their cases. Such being the situation, some of the European powers began to consider the use of force as a means of securing justice for their nationals. This of course meant the occupation of Venezuelan ports or territory and possibly a lodgement à l'Egypte. This would obviously be a viola-

tion of the Monroe Doctrine. Besides, the United States would be blockaded in its newly acquired strategical position in the Panama Canal.

The position that Roosevelt assumed in this affair is rather the opposite of the attitude that he took toward the Dominican crisis. He and Secretary Hay constantly assured Germany and England that the Monroe Doctrine did not permit the United States to protect an American state if such a state failed to meet its obligations. In his annual message of December 3, 1901, he had said:

*** We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power.¹¹

And on July 12, 1901 he had written:

If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it.¹²

Obviously Roosevelt was not against European intervention to a certain extent. In fact, with this assurance from the United States, Germany and England prepared a joint naval expedition for December, 1902, to March, 1903, to support their demands to Castro. The latter refused to accept their ultimata for payments. Germany and Britain, then, retired their representatives from Caracas, took possession of four Venezuelan gunboats, and sent three of them to the bottom. Great Britain blockaded the five principal ports and the mouth of the Orinoco River; Italy joined with two cruisers. Germany and Britain bombarded two forts at Puerto Cabello. Thereupon, Castro quickly made a request for arbitration through the United States. The intervening powers immediately accepted arbitration provided certain preferred claims were paid without question.

Castro accepted this demand of the European powers and as for the remaining claims of all foreign nationals, it was agreed to submit them to a series of mixed claims commissions for arbitration. Then the question of priority came up. Should the intervening powers receive priority over the peaceful claimants? It was finally agreed to submit the question to the judgment of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. This question of priority deserves attention because no doubt it had a bearing on Roosevelt's attitude toward Dominican intervention.

While the Venezuelan controversy was being waged, Dr. Luis M. Drago, Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic, submitted to the United States his famous pronouncement "that the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations."¹³ This doctrine ran contrariwise to President Roosevelt's position. In the Hague Conference of 1907 Roosevelt supported the Drago proposition and got it adopted as an international convention. But in the Santo Domingo affair Roosevelt acted in flagrant denial of its principles.

Soon after the Venezuelan crisis eased off, the European powers, especially England, intimated that if the United States wanted to assume authority in the Caribbean area, it should also assume responsibility for the foreign debts of the Caribbean republics. A government spokesman in the House of Commons, for example, declared that,

If the United States could see their way to the adoption of some accepted course by which these periodical difficulties arising between the great Powers and some of the states of South America could be prevented, I think I may say it would meet with cordial concurrence in this country.¹⁴

Several British newspapers supported the government's view, also. This

pressure from the European powers no doubt helped to shape Roosevelt's policy.

On February 22, 1904, the Hague Court of Permanent Arbitration handed down its decision on the preferential rights of the intervening powers to the designated Venezuelan assets. The court unequivocally decided that Germany, Great Britain, and Italy had a right to payment ahead of the peaceful powers.

The Hague decision obviously sanctioned the right of European powers to intervention against a delinquent state. This put the United States diplomacy in a serious dilemma. In the Caribbean and in Central America there were other republics whose irresponsibility of their obligations to foreigners gave occasion for serious concern. Their political set-ups were constantly being upset. The United States was put into a predicament. Bemis puts it this way:

Should the United States stand by with folded arms while non-American powers, backed in principle by a Hague Court decision, intervened or perhaps ensconced themselves in strategic positions from which in the future they might cut the Panama life-line and the security of the Continental Republic; or should it intervene itself to guarantee justice and responsibility in strategically located countries whose position invited foreign intervention, and thereby run the risk of incurring by its own intervention the misunderstanding and animosity of the neighboring republics?¹⁵

The issue was clear, and in considering the intervention in Santo Domingo, it is convenient to keep in mind the influence that such a decision might have had on Roosevelt. The Venezuelan situation was repeating itself, but now the situation was aggravated because of the Court's decision. The decision seemed to have emboldened the European powers while increasing the fears of the United States.

With this new phase of the historical background, let us now proceed to examine Roosevelt's statements with reference to the Dominican affair.

In a letter to Joseph Bucklin Bishop on February 23, 1904, Roosevelt wrote as follows:

I have been hoping and praying for three months that the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to. Is that strong enough? I have asked some of our people to go there because, after having refused for three months to do anything, the attitude of Santo Domingo has become one of half chaotic war toward us. If it is absolutely necessary to do something, then I want to do as little as possible. This government has been bedeviling us to establish some kind of protectorate over the islands, and take charge of the finances. We have been answering them that we could not possibly go into the subject at all.¹⁶

The people that Roosevelt is speaking of refers to the mission of Loomis and Dewey. Roosevelt seems to exaggerate the desire of Santo Domingo to have the United States "take charge of the finances." It should be remembered that at this time General Sanchez was in Washington trying to negotiate a treaty and that his terms only proposed a lease of Samana and Manzanillo Bay. The idea of taking charge of the Dominican finances originated in Washington.

On May 20, 1904, Roosevelt addressed a letter to the Secretary of War Root with the suggestion that it be read at a dinner in New York that night. The sole desire of the United States, this communication said, was:

to see all neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. ... Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count on our hearty friendliness. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore this duty.¹⁷

The letter caused widespread praise and condemnation. The President, however, in another letter to Root on June 7, 1904, maintained that his position was

the simplest common sense, and only the fool or the coward can treat it as aught else. ... If we are willing to let Germany or England act as the policeman of the Caribbean, then we can afford not to interfere when gross wrong-doing occurs. But if we intend to say "Hands off" to the powers of Europe, sooner or later we must keep order ourselves.¹⁸

The letter of May 20 seems to indicate that Roosevelt had not abandoned the idea of intervention as he had told through his Secretary of State to General Sanchez on March 29. Was he trying to gauge public opinion? Perhaps the fact that there was condemnation led him to drop any projects of intervention at that time (the stage was ready then) and wait until after the November election. In the meantime Dillingham could maintain Morales in power. The letter is a pronouncement of what came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary in the annual message of December 6, 1904.

In the letter of June 7, Roosevelt is clearly saying that in order to keep Europe out the United States has to intervene. It did not occur to him that perhaps a solution could have been worked out without the intervention of the United States. Why not resort to arbitration as in the case of Venezuela? Was Roosevelt afraid of another unfavorable decision like the one handed down by the Hague Court?

In his Annual Message of December 6, 1904, Roosevelt formally announced his famous corollary. He wrote:

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count

on our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it needs fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.¹⁹

In both letters to Root and in this message the President uses the argument of national defense as the excuse for intervention. He maintains that the defense of the Monroe Doctrine is the basic motive behind his Dominican policy. Besides, he constantly insists that the United States had no desire for aggrandizement. Apparently he overlooked, in his constant repetitions, that he was initiating a new phase of imperialism on the diplomacy of the United States, which was to have far-reaching effects in the near future.

On February 15, 1905, President Roosevelt sent a message to the Senate, submitting the protocol of February 7. In this message he stressed three motives that led the United States to sign such an agreement; namely, national security, economic interest, and benevolence. The message is quoted almost in full because it not only shows Roosevelt's motives but it gives at the same time a brief account of the economic and political situation on the island. Said the President:

The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and revolutions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are without question improper or exorbitant, constituting claims which should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very small portion of their nominal value.

Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the custom-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.

It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be

found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps.

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.

One of the difficult and increasingly complicated problems, which often arise in Santo Domingo, grows out of the violations of contracts and concessions, sometimes improvidently granted, with valuable privileges and exemptions stipulated for upon grossly inadequate considerations which were burdensome to the State, and which are not infrequently disregarded and violated by the governing authorities. Citizens of the United States and of other governments holding these concessions and contracts appeal to their respective governments for active protection and intervention. Except for arbitrary wrong, done or sanctioned by superior authority, to persons or to vested property rights, the United States Government, following its traditional usage in such cases, aims to go no further than the mere use of its good offices, a measure which frequently proves ineffective. On the other hand, there are governments which do sometimes take energetic action for the protection of their subjects in the enforcement of merely contractual claims, and thereupon American concessionaries, supported by powerful influences, make loud appeal to the United States Government in similar cases for similar action. They complain that in the actual posture of affairs their valuable properties are practically confiscated, that American enterprise is paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected, even by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it means the abandonment to the subjects of other governments of the interests of American trade and commerce through the sacrifice of their investments by excessive taxes imposed in

violation of contract, and by other devices, and the sacrifice of the output of their mines and other industries, and even of their railway and shipping interests, which they have established in connection with the exploitation of their concessions. Thus the attempted solution of the complex problem by the ordinary methods of diplomacy reacts injuriously upon the United States Government itself, and in a measure paralyzes the action of the Executive in the direction of a sound and consistent policy. The United States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster American enterprise and the growth of our commerce through the cultivation of friendly relations with Santo Domingo, by the irritating effects on those relations, and the consequent injurious influence upon that commerce, of frequent interventions. As a method of solution of the complicated problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as, in the condition of its finances, an award against the Republic is worthless unless its payment is secured by the pledge of at least some portion of the customs revenues. This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over of the custom-houses to secure the appropriation of the pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situation again reacts injuriously upon the relations of the United States with other nations. For when an award and such security are thus obtained, as in the case of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign government complains that the award conflicts with its rights, as a creditor, to some portion of these revenues under an alleged prior pledge; and still other governments complain that an award in any considerable sum, secured by pledges of the customs revenues, is prejudicial to the payment of their equally meritorious claims out of the ordinary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten between the United States and other creditor nations, because of the apparent sacrifice of some of their claims, which may be just or may be grossly exaggerated, but which the United States Government can not inquire into without giving grounds of offense to other friendly creditor nations. Still further illustrations might easily be furnished of the hopelessness of the present situation growing out of the social disorders and the bankrupt finances of the Dominican Republic, where for considerable periods during recent years the bonds of civil society have been practically dissolved.

Under the accepted law of nations foreign governments are within their right, if they choose to exercise it, when they actively intervene in support of the contractual claims of their subjects. They sometimes exercise this power, and on account of commercial rivalries there is a growing tendency on the part of other governments more and more to aid diplomatically in the enforcement of the claims of their subjects.

In view of the dilemma in which the Government of the United States is thus placed, it must either adhere to its usual attitude of nonintervention in such cases -- an attitude proper under normal conditions, but one which in this particular kind of case results to the disadvantage of its citizens in comparison with those of other States -- or else it must, in order to be consistent in its policy, actively intervene to protect the contracts and concessions of its citizens engaged in agriculture, commerce, and transportation in competition with the subjects and citizens of other States. This course would render the United States the insurer of all the speculative risks of its citizens in the public securities and franchises of Santo Domingo.

Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to the Senate, insuring a faithful collection and application of the revenues to the specified objects, we are well assured that this difficult task can be accomplished with the friendly cooperation and good will of all the parties concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Republic.

The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the island, as well as the security of American interests, and they are intimately associated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction. At one time, and that only a year ago, three revolutions were in progress in the island at the same time.

It is impossible to state with anything like approximate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Republic. In the report of the commission appointed by President Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman's Yearbook for 1904 the estimated population in 1888 is given as 610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics considers this the best estimate of the present population of the Republic. As shown by the unanimous report of the Grant commission the public debt of the Dominican Republic, including claims, was \$1,565,831.59½. The total revenues were \$772,684.75½. The public indebtedness of the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised, \$32,280,000; the estimated revenues under Dominican management of custom-houses were \$1,850,000; the proposed budget for current administration was \$1,500,000, leaving only \$350,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and payments on these latter will amount during the ensuing year to \$1,700,000, besides \$900,000 of arrearages of payments overdue, amounting in all to \$2,600,000. It is therefore impossible under exist-

ing conditions, which are chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the Republic, which during the last decade have averaged approximately \$1,600,000, to defray the ordinary expenses of the government and to meet its obligations.

The Dominican debt owed to European creditors is about \$22,000,000, and of this sum over \$18,000,000 is more or less formally recognized. The representatives of European governments have several times approached the Secretary of State, setting forth the wrongs and intolerable delays to which they have been subjected at the hands of the successive governments of Santo Domingo in the collection of their just claims, and intimating that unless the Dominican Government should receive some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its finances, the creditor governments in Europe would be forced to resort to more effective measures of compulsion to secure the satisfaction of their claims.

If the United States Government declines to take action and other foreign governments resort to action to secure payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled, according to the decision of the Hague tribunal in the Venezuelan cases, to the preferential payment of their claims; and this would absorb all the Dominican revenues and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and interests in the island. If, moreover, any such action should be taken by them, the only method to enable them to secure the payment of their claims would be to take possession of the custom-houses, and considering the state of the Dominican finances, this would mean a definite and very possibly permanent occupation of Dominican territory, for no period could be set to the time which would be necessarily required for the payment of their obligations and unliquidated claims. The United States Government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or else virtually saying to European governments that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would be an unfortunate attitude for the Government of the United States to be forced to maintain at present. It can not with propriety say that it will protect its own citizens and interests, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand refuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens and interests.

* * * *

During the past two years the European claimants, except the English, whose interests were embraced in those of the American companies, have, with the support of their respective governments, been growing more and more importunate in

pressing their unsatisfied demands. The French and the Belgians in 1901 had entered into a contract with the Dominican Government, but after a few payments were made on account it fell into neglect. Other governments also obliged the Dominican Government to enter into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues of the Republic were in large part sequestered, and under one of the agreements, which was concluded with Italy in 1903, the minister of that government was empowered directly to collect from the importers and exporters that portion of the customs revenues assigned to him as security. As the result of chronic disorders, attendant with a constant increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has become hopeless, unless the United States or some other strong government shall interpose to bring order out of the chaos. The custom-houses, with the exception of the two in the possession of the financial agent appointed by the United States, have become unproductive for the discharge of indebtedness, except as to persons making emergency loans to the government or to its enemies for the purpose of carrying on political contests by force. They have, in fact, become the maul of the various revolutions. The first effort of the revolutionists is to take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which are then disposed of at the absolute discretion of those who are collecting them. The chronic disorders prevailing in Santo Domingo have, moreover, become exceedingly dangerous to the interests of Americans holding property in that country. Constant complaints have been received of the injuries and inconveniences to which they have been subjected. As an evidence of the increasing aggravation of conditions the fact may be mentioned that about a year ago the American railway, which had previously been exempt from such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn up, and a station destroyed by revolutionary bands.

The ordinary resources of diplomacy and international arbitration are absolutely impotent to deal wisely and effectively with the situation in the Dominican Republic, which can only be met by organizing its finances on a sound basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the temptation of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our duty under our traditional policy toward the Dominican people, who aspire to a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other government to adopt its own measures in order to safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves take reasonable and appropriate action.

Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf the aid of the United States. It has repeatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 it sought to enter into

treaty relations by which it would be placed under the protection of the United States Government. The request was refused. Again, in January, 1904, its minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to enable it to escape from its financial and social disorders. Compliance with this request was again declined, for this government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way, and has finally concluded to take action only because it has become evident that failure to do so may result in a situation fraught with grave danger to the cause of international peace.

In 1903 a representative of a foreign government proposed to the United States the joint fiscal control of the Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations, and that the latter should take charge of the custom-houses and revenues and give the Dominican Government a certain percentage and apply the residue to the payment ratably of claims of foreign creditors. The United States Government declined to approve or to enter into such an arrangement. But it has now become evident that decided action of some kind ~~can not~~ be much longer delayed. In view of our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the United States Government to take any effective action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe doctrine can only be considered as an acquiescence in some such action by another government.

That most wise measure of international statesmanship, the Platt amendment, has provided a method for preventing such difficulties from arising in the new Republic of Cuba. In accordance with the terms of this amendment the Republic of Cuba can not issue any bonds which can be collected from Cuba, save as a matter of grace, unless with the consent of the United States, which is at liberty at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Platt amendment. If a similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrangement no larger debt would be incurred than could be honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus authorized would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no consideration and who would be permitted to receive none; so that the honest creditor would on the one hand be safe while on the other hand the Republic would be safeguarded against molestation in the interest of mere speculators.

But no such plan at present exists; and under existing circumstances, when the condition of affairs becomes such as

it has become in Santo Domingo, either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as that herewith submitted to the Senate. In this case, fortunately, the prudent and far-seeing statesmanship of the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble. At their request we have entered into the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the remainder being used by the United States to pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe doctrine means precisely such a guaranty on our part.

It is perhaps unnecessary to state that no step of any kind has been taken by the Administration under the terms of the protocol which is herewith submitted.

The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol wisely and patriotically accepted the responsibilities as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its resources will permit of its obligations. More than this it can not do, and when it has done this we should not permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request of the government concerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform this duty in good faith and without any intention of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our weaker neighbors or of conducting ourselves otherwise than so as to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European powers which may be brought into contact with them. It is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove by our action that the world may trust in our good faith and may understand that this international duty will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with strict justice toward all. If this is done, a general acceptance of the Monroe doctrine will in the end surely follow; and this will mean an increase of the sphere in which peaceful measures for the settlement of international difficulties gradually displace those of a warlike character.

We can point with just pride to what we have done in Cuba as a guaranty of our good faith. We stayed in Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to self-government, which she has since trod with such marked and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we exacted no conditions save such as would prevent her from ever becoming the prey of the stranger. Our purpose in Santo Domingo is as beneficent. The good that this country got from its action in Cuba was in-

direct rather than direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The chief material advantage that will come from the action proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and to Santo Domingo's creditors. The advantages that will come to the United States will be indirect, but nevertheless great, for it is supremely to our interest that all the communities immediately south of us should be or become prosperous and stable, and therefor not merely in name, but in fact independent and self-governing.

I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on this matter. We now have a great opportunity to secure peace and stability in the island, without friction or bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of the governmental authorities themselves. It will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe doctrine.²⁰

In this message Theodore Roosevelt again and again points out the the United States was forced to step in because the Monroe Doctrine was being threatened. But he does not mention specifically who is threatening the security of the United States. He speaks of "representatives of European governments" and of "a representative of a foreign government," but that is as far as he goes. Perhaps he wants the public to think of the German menace.

At the beginning of the message Roosevelt mentions "certain responsibilities" that "those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept." In another place he alludes to the "duty" of the United States "under the Monroe Doctrine", and in still another he touches on the "international duty which is necessarily involved in any assertion of the Monroe Doctrine." In his letter to Root of May 20, 1904, he had also spoken of the "duty" of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Obviously he was enlarging on the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine which was originally intended to regulate the conduct of the European powers in the Western Hemisphere, was now being used to regu-

late the conduct of American states in regard to European powers. Roosevelt seems naive in his statements. In view of his previous conduct in regard to Columbia, one is led to believe that coercion of the American states that did not "behave" was really what he had in mind. Even if the Dominican government had not been so friendly, probably Roosevelt would have intervened any way.

In his letter to Root of June 7, 1904, Roosevelt used the word "policeman," and in his corollary of December, 1904, he spoke of "international police power," but in his message to the Senate he was merely giving "assistance" and "relief."

According to Roosevelt, nothing was being done which was not in complete accordance with the Dominican authorities. "Again and again the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf the aid of the United States," he said. Apparently he forgot that no plebiscite had been taken, that the Morales government was in power due to the opportune intervention of the Navy, that the Navy had to support the Improvement Company in the collection of customs, and that the idea of customs control by the United States had originated in Washington.

Roosevelt, however, did not conceal to the Senate that economic interests were at stake. Throughout his message the emphasis that he puts on these interests almost constitutes a subtheme.

As the Senate paid little attention to the treaty, on March 6, 1905, the Senate being in executive session, the President sent to it a special message concerning the agreement with Santo Domingo and urging prompt action.

Among other things he called the attention of the Senate to the following facts:

This treaty was entered into at the earnest request of Santo Domingo itself, and is designed to afford Santo Domingo relief and assistance. Its primary benefit will be to Santo Domingo. ...

The benefit to the United States will consist chiefly in the tendency under the treaty to secure stability, order, and prosperity in Santo Domingo [conditions which favored American interests]. ...

This treaty affords the most practicable means of obtaining payment for the just claims of American citizens. ...

... If it is not ratified, the chances are that American creditors will fare ill as compared to those of other nations...

... our position is explicitly and unreservedly that under no circumstances do we intend to acquire territory in or possession of ... Santo Domingo ...

Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that we are willing to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and the expressions of friendship, repeatedly sanctioned by the people and Government of the United States, warrant her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of her need.²¹

President Roosevelt shifted his emphasis now. Originally the main tenet for intervention was the so-called "international duty" of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine, with one emphasis on economic interests and a minor emphasis on benevolence. But now the rendering of "relief and assistance" takes first place. National security and economic interests just fitted into the picture.

In an address delivered on the subject at Chauteauqua in New York on August 11, Roosevelt alluded to motives of strategy and benevolence. But the latter occupied more than half of the speech. He spoke of bearing one another's burden, and of helping the weaker brother. Santo Domingo, too, deserved the same chance to move upward as had been given to Cuba.

Writing to Henry Cabot Lodge on September 14, he said that all he had done in the Dominican question had been from an "altruistic" motive.

In his annual message of December 5, 1905, he touched on the subject again.²² The part of that speech related to the Monroe Doctrine and its bearing on Santo Domingo followed closely the outline of his Chautauqua address. Emphasis is given again to national security, the Panama Canal being mentioned, and to the welfare of claimants and investors. Two nations are mentioned as being on the point of intervention when negotiations were started that resulted in the treaty which was then before the Senate. As to his procedure, that is, that it was the duty of the United States to intervene in Latin America whenever the circumstances required it, he said:

It is of benefit to our people; it is of benefit to foreign peoples; and most of all it is really of benefit to the people of the country concerned.

Roosevelt's pleas fell on deaf ears. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty. It seems that that body did not see the need for immediate intervention, for it was not until February 25, 1907, that the treaty was ratified and then with some amendments.

However, Roosevelt was not daunted by senatorial opposition. By an executive agreement he set up a modus vivendi on April 1, 1905. It remained in operation until the Senate ratified the treaty on February 25, 1907, and was potentially backed by the U. S. Navy. American officials for collecting the customs entered on their duties, the danger of European intervention was eliminated, and the Dominican Republic regained some degree of stability and order. The agreement had essentially the same provisions of the treaty.

There is no doubt that Roosevelt was ready to use force when necessary, for on September 5, 1905, he sent to the Secretary of the Navy the

following order:

As to the Santo Domingo matter, tell Admiral Bradford to stop any revolution. [Bradford was commander of a naval vessel near the island.] I intend to keep the island on status quo until the Senate has had time to act on the treaty, and I shall treat any revolutionary movement as an effort to upset the modus vivendi. That this is ethically right, I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical or red tape difficulty.²³

The results of his action were described by the President in a speech before the Harvard Union on February 3, 1907. Said he:

I was immensely amused when at a professional peace meeting the other day, they incidentally alluded to me as having made "war" on Santo Domingo. The war I have made literally consists in having loaned them a collector of customs, at their request. We now give them forty-five per cent. of the customs to run the Government, and the other fifty-five per cent. is put up to pay those of their debts which are found righteous. This arrangement has gone on for two years now, while the coordinate branch of Government discussed whether or not I had usurped power in the matter, and finally concluded I had not, and ratified the treaty. Of the fifty-five per cent. we have been able to put two and a half millions toward paying their debts; and with the forty-five per cent. that we collected for them they have received more money than they ever got when they collected one hundred per cent. themselves; and the island has prospered as never before. I feel like paraphrasing Patrick Henry: "If this is 'war,' make the most of it."²⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Fred Rippey, "The Initiation of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic," The Hispanic American Historical Review, 1937, XVIII, 417.
2. The letters quoted and summarized in this first section are taken from the above-mentioned article by J. Fred Rippey, pp. 426-429. The originals will be found in the appropriate volume of the Miscellaneous Letters in the Archives of the State Department of the United States. This miscellaneous file is arranged chronologically.
3. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (20 vols., New York, 1922), XX, (summary given in cyclopedic index under the subject of Santo Domingo).
4. The letters quoted and summarized in this section are taken from Rippey's article, pp. 429-438. Unless otherwise indicated the originals will be found in the State Department of the United States, Despatches from the Dominican Republic (a chronological file).
5. Quoted from Instructions, Dominican Republic, vol. I, by J. Fred Rippey, pp. 436-437. The printed instruction is dated December 30, 1904.
6. The letters quoted and summarized in this section are taken from Rippey's article, pp. 438-448. The originals of the letters from Powell and Dawson are preserved in appropriate volumes of Despatches from the Dominican Republic. Except as otherwise indicated the remainder of the correspondence cited will be found in the Miscellaneous Letters.
7. Rippey, pp. 440-441.
8. Ibid., p. 441.
9. Memorandum for the Secretary of State in the Dominican Republic, pp. 324. This Memorandum was published by Frank B. Loomis for the confidential information of the State Department. It bore the date of March 19, 1904.
10. Rippey, p. 448.
11. Richardson, XIV, p. 665.
12. Roosevelt to Von Sternberg, July 12, 1901, quoted by Henry H. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1951), p. 283.
13. Quoted by Samuel Flagg Bemis, Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), p. 147.

14. Quoted by Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1941), p. 233.
15. Bemis, pp. 151-152.
16. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York, 1920), vol. I, p. 431.
17. Quoted by Pringle, p. 294.
18. Quoted by Pringle, p. 295.
19. Richardson, XIV, pp. 6923-6924.
20. Foreign Relations (1905), pp. 334-342.
21. Richardson, XIV, pp. 6950-6951.
22. Ibid., pp. 6694-6699.
23. Quoted by Bishop, p. 434.
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APPENDICESAppendix I

ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE*

Contained in the President's Message of December 2, 1923

* * * * *

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

* * * * *

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need be scarcely remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to

* Quoted from the original manuscript copy in the Senate archives by Samuel F. Bemis, Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), pp. 63-65.

the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the war which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and these new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

Appendix II

COPY OF THE PROTOCOL SUBMITTED BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT WITH
HIS SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE SENATE ON FEBRUARY 15, 1905*

(With minor amendments this protocol served as the basis
for the convention signed with Santo Domingo on February
8, 1907, and which the Senate ratified on February 25, 1907.)

Whereas the Dominican Government in view of the debts which burden the Republic, the imminent peril and urgent menace of intervention on the part of nations whose citizens have claims already established or to be established, finding itself, as it does, unable peremptorily to fulfill its obligations on account of the condition to which political disturbances and other causes have brought the Treasury, the result being that these obligations are falling due without its having been possible to pay them, or even the interest thereon, desires to reach an arrangement with all its creditors and the government itself succeed in assuring the regular receipt of revenues sufficient for the payment of its internal administration and the maintenance of its administrative autonomy without any interruption by the exigencies of foreign creditors or by internal political disturbances, and,

Whereas the Government of the United States of America, viewing any attempt on the part of the governments outside of this hemisphere to oppress or control the destiny of the Dominican Republic as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States is, in compliance with the request of the Dominican Government, disposed to lend its assistance toward effecting a satisfactory arrangement with all the creditors of the Dominican Government, agreeing to respect the complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic:

The Dominican Government represented by the secretary of state of foreign relations, Citizen Juan Francisco Sanchez, and the secretary of state of finance and commerce, Citizen Federico Velasquez, and the United States Government represented by its minister resident, Thomas G. Dawson, have agreed and covenanted as follows:

Article First. The United States Government agrees to attempt the adjustment of all the obligations of the Dominican Government, foreign as well as domestic; the adjustment of the payment and of the conditions of amortization; the consideration of conflicting and unreasonable claims, and the determination of the validity and amount of all pending claims,

If, in order to reach such adjustment, it shall be considered necessary to name one or more commissions, the Dominican Government shall

* Foreign Relations (1905), pp. 342-343

be represented on said commissions.

Article Second. In order to enable the United States Government to render the assistance above mentioned, it shall take charge of the existing custom-houses and those which may hereafter be created, shall name the employees necessary to their management, and shall collect and take charge of all custom-house receipts.

These employees shall be subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Government may appoint in each of the custom-houses an officer for the purpose of making an inspection on behalf of Dominican interests.

Article Third. Out of the revenues which shall be collected in all the custom-houses of the Republic, the Government of the United States shall deliver to the Dominican Government a sum, which shall not be less than 45 per cent of the total amount collected, for the purpose of meeting the needs of the public service, and which the Dominican Government shall receive in monthly payments from the date of the taking possession of the custom-houses by the officials of the United States, divided into four installments in the following manner:

Forty-five per cent of the total sum collected monthly in periods ending on the 8th, 15th, 22d, and the last day of each month.

Article Fourth. The Government of the United States will apply the 55 per cent which it retains toward the payment of--

- A. The employees of all the custom-houses.
- B. The interest, amortization, and installments of the Dominican debt, foreign and domestic, in accordance with what is hereinbefore provided, according as it shall be fixed and liquidated.
- C. The whole surplus which may remain at the end of each fiscal year shall be delivered to the Government of the Dominican Republic, or shall be devoted to the payment of its debts, if it shall so determine.

Article Fifth. The collectors in the custom houses shall send monthly to the contaduria-general and the Department of the Treasury statements of the corresponding income and outgo, and annually a general statement which shall embrace the total of what has been collected and paid out.

Article Sixth. Any reform of the system of duties and taxes shall be made in agreement with the President of the United States, and therefore the present tariff and port dues may not be reduced except with his consent, as long as the whole of the debt which the Government of the United States takes charge of shall not have been completely paid, with

the exception of the export duties upon national products which the Dominican Government remains authorized to abolish or reduce immediately, but not to increase said export duties or its public debt without the consent of the President of the United States.

Article Seventh. The Government of the United States, at the request of the Dominican Republic, shall grant the latter such other assistance as the former may deem proper to restore the credit, preserve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administration, and advance the material progress and welfare of the Dominican Republic.

Article Eighth. This agreement shall continue in force during the time required for the amortization of the debt of which the Government of the United States takes charge.

Article Ninth. This agreement shall take effect after its approval by the United States Senate and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

Done in four originals, two being in the Spanish language, and two in the English and the representatives of the high contracting parties signing them in the city of Santo Domingo, February the seventh, nineteen hundred and five.

Pedro. Velásquez.

Thomas C. Dawson.
Juan Fco. Sanchez.